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JURORS AND THE FUTURE OF "TORT REFORM"
JUDGE

B. MICHAEL DANN (RET.)*

INTRODUCTION

Jurors decide almost all tort cases that go to trial in the United
States. Their verdicts are usually the final word in any particular case
and greatly influence which injuries and deaths result in a claim in the
first instance, and whether or not a case is settled. But unlike the
litigants, their proxies (primarily insurance companies), and the
parties' attorneys, jurors do not have a personal stake in the outcomes
of a lawsuit. However, their chances of reaching an accurate and just
result are facilitated or hindered by both trial procedures and rules of
evidence that affect the jurors' abilities to understand the parties'
claims and defenses, the evidence, the applicable law, and how this
law applies to the facts they find. Thus, jurors have an articulable
interest, or stake, in the process used at trials to determine liability
and damages.
Jurors are a fleeting constituency. They are supposed to be. Juries are composed of private citizens who serve without ambition and
then disband, returning to the relative anonymity of their everyday
lives. Jurors are not represented by legislative lobbyists and, traditionally at least, concerns about jury comprehension regarding
procedural and legal issues have not figured prominently in legislative
and judicial decision-making processes.' For these and other reasons,
* Formerly Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona (Phoenix) (1980-2000);
Visiting Fellow, National Institute of Justice (current) and National Center for State Courts
(2000-2002). The views expressed in this Essay are those of the author alone and do not
necessarily represent those of the National Institute of Justice or the National Center for State
Courts.
1. See generally Edmund M. Morgan, PracticalDifficulties Impeding Reform in the Law of
Evidence, 14 VAND. L. REV. 725 (1961). Happily, conditions have changed in the past decade.
Several states and individual state and federal judges have adopted, or are considering use of,
procedural reforms to the traditional jury trial for the express purpose of enhancing juror
understanding of the evidence and the law. For accounts of the jury reform movement, see
generally JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997); Robert
Boatright & Elissa Krauss, Jury Summit 2001, 86 JUDICATURE 145 (2002); Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Jury Reform at the End of the Century: Real Agreement, Real Changes, 32 U. MICH J.L.
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legitimate juror needs and interests do not usually surface in "tort
reform"'2 debates over various proposals that would modify current
tort law and civil practice.
This Essay will discuss past and current tort reform proposals for

their potential to enhance jury comprehension and decision making in
tort litigation.3 A calculus, or way of analyzing various tort reform
ideas with jurors' legitimate interests in mind, will be suggested for
use by policymakers in determining whether and to what extent a
given tort reform proposal might benefit juries. When a particular
reform idea offers the potential to significantly assist or hinder jury
decision making, that factor ought to be weighed in the balancealong with the interests of the primary stakeholders and the public at
large-when legal policymakers consider those tort reform measures
on their merits.
I.

CITIZENS' VERSUS JURORS' STAKES IN TORT LAW

The point of this Essay is that citizen-jurors, as jurors, have certain interests, or a stake, in the American tort system and in certain
proposals that would change it.

But their legitimate interests, as

jurors, are different from those of ordinary citizens. In their roles as
citizens-whether as political constituents and voters, public officials,

actual or potential tort victims, defendants in a tort action, or in other
civic capacities-they can be expected to have perspectives and
interests different from those that jurors have. The general citizenry
is, and should be, concerned about the political, economic, and moral
soundness of the tort system, as well as, how it might impact their

personal, business, and professional lives. While jurors are undoubtREFORM 213 (1999); G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79
JUDICATURE 216 (1996); Franklin Strier, The Road to Reform: Judges on Juries and Attorneys,
30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1249 (1997).

2. Partisans in the "tort reform" debates that ebb and flow do not agree that all proposals
amount to "reform," and they trade accusations about the other side's real motives. Beyond
what is stated here about proposals' potential to assist or hinder the work of jurors, the author
does not express any views on the wisdom, or lack thereof, of any idea or suggestion that has
been advanced by others.
3. The many tort reform ideas listed in the accompanying chart were taken from recent
print journal articles and from web sites of the following organizations: The American Tort
Reform Association, The American Trial Lawyers Association, Center for Justice & Democracy, Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, The Washington Legal Foundation, Public Citizen, The
Manhattan Institute, and the American Legislative Exchange Council (sponsoring the "Model
Jury Patriotism Act"). See http://www.atra.org; http://www.atla.org; http://www.centerjd.ord;
http://www.cala.com; http://www.wlf.org; http://www.citizen.org; http://www.manhattaninstitute.org; http://www.alec.rog; respectively.
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edly influenced by those beliefs or concerns, their interests as jurors
are different and fewer.
The jurors' role is to decide the case before it in accordance with
the applicable law, as fairly and justly as possible. That is its proper
role and sworn duty. Theoretically, jurors may not act on their
opinions toward the law or the tort system. As a general proposition,
the law's soundness and fairness is not the jurors' legitimate concern.
Rather, they are rightly concerned with how the law applies to the
particular facts proven at trial and whether the result is just.
There is another important distinction between citizens' and jurors' stakes in the tort system. Citizens and policymakers should be
concerned about the continued vitality of the jury as a constitutional
and political institution that plays a central role in the American
justice system. Jurors, on the other hand, need and expect procedures
and tools that enable them to do the best possible job they can in
deciding just one case. Thus, while the former are mindful of the
future of juries and jury trials in the grand scheme of things, actual
jurors' interests lie more in the nuts and bolts of the trial and whether
jurors have the information and means necessary for a wise and fair
verdict in the case before them.
Clearly, any principled description of jurors' "stakes" in tort reform will differ widely from those of litigants, insurance companies,
most members of the bar, those occupations and professions that are
frequently involved in tort litigation, and those who are involved in
the politics of tort reform. Jurors have a unique perspective since
they are expected to set aside, to the extent possible, any partisan
feelings and beliefs about the tort reform agenda.
II.

WHEN AND WHERE JURORS' INTERESTS EMERGE

Jurors sit on just one case, or on a very few depending on the
length of their term of service, then disband and return to the relative
anonymity of their individual lives never to convene again. When
they sit together during trial and deliberations, however, jurors act
both as judges in resolving factual disputes and also as legislators in
determining which rules of law to apply to the case (a lawmaking
function, if only for that particular case). In hearing, evaluating, and
deciding the facts of the case, jurors have a strong need for trial
procedures, practices, and policies that enhance their abilities to
understand the evidence, the applicable law, and their roles and
responsibilities. These aids to comprehension spring from rules or
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statutes of procedure, evidence law, legal instructions, substantive
tort law, and from other actions and decisions of the trial judge and
attorneys. Therefore, jurors will benefit from any tort reform proposal that will, by its terms or consequences, enhance jury comprehension-that is, provide jurors with tools they can use to better
understand the evidence, the law, and their duties. By way of illustration, proposals to give jurors more explicit guidelines for their use in
deciding whether a given product is defective or what conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages will assist jurors in the
performance of their duties. But that assistance will occur only if the
new standards and definitions are communicated to the jury in a clear
and comprehensible manner.
A second identifiable and legitimate concern of jurors is more
ephemeral and relates to notions of respect, trust, and honesty.
Jurors, like the rest of us, need to understand that their work is
meaningful and that their decisions make a difference. If jurors are
misled concerning the consequences of their decision in a case, or if
the effects of a decision are not adequately explained to enable the
informed exercise of their discretion in judging the facts and applying
the law, frustration, disappointment, and even anger can result.4 This
is much more than a mere "feel-good" exercise to improve juror
satisfaction with their general experience. I am attempting to describe procedural and legal rules and practices that keep necessary
and relevant truth from the jury.
An example of a collaborative approach to instructing the jury in
tort cases is the suggestion5 that judges routinely tell jurors that
considerations of insurance should not enter into their deliberations
and decision. The suggested instruction should also convey the public

4. See generally Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury
Instruction on Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 743 (2000); Neil Vidmar, The
Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998);
cf. Jurors Claim They Were Misled in Marijuana Trial, TACOMA NEWS TRIB. Feb. 6, 2003
(reporting jurors felt "cheated" after not being told that defendant in federal marijuana
prosecution thought he was acting in accordance with California's medical marijuana statute).
5. Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics,
87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1907-11 (2001) (recognizing the likelihood that the subject of insurance
will arise and may affect jurors' deliberations when nothing is told to them on the subject, a
more sound behavioral approach is to treat the jury collaboratively and instruct them in a
straight-forward manner on the subject).
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policy and practical reasons why they should not be concerned with
questions of insurance. Such an approach clarifies an often vexing
problem for jurors, judges, and attorneys, and enhances the legal
soundness of the jury's deliberations and verdict. It treats jurors as
respected and responsible adult decision makers, is honest in its
message, and accommodates jurors' needs to be treated in a way
consistent with the deference given to the right to trial by jury. Since
we expect wise and just decisions from jurors and often criticize them
when a seemingly errant verdict is publicized, we should not treat
them as, or worse than, children.
A recurrent tort reform proposal-the idea of capping jury verdicts for noneconomic losses in all or some tort litigation-is another
example of the kind of change that represents an opportunity for such
a collaborative approach to instructing the jury. In jurisdictions
where caps are placed on such awards, jurors ought to hear about
them and the applicable maximum amount the jury can award, if only
to prevent the needless expenditure of time and effort deliberating on
amounts in excess of the cap. A collaborative instruction also would
avoid juror frustration, or worse, on learning that their verdict, made
in ignorance of the cap, is of no consequence to the extent it exceeds
the statutory limit. Alas, most jurisdictions that have enacted caps on
6
such awards do not tell their juries about the legal limits on verdicts.
III. RANKING TORT REFORM PROPOSALS' "SALIENCE" WITH
JURORS

Two kinds of real and proposed changes to American tort law
have been identified for their potential to assist jurors: first, are those

proposals that offer the hope of enhancing juror understanding of the
evidence, the law, and the jurors' duties; and, second, are those

proposals which by their nature suggest or require that jurors be told
of the legal and practical consequences of their verdicts. There may
6. See Michael. S. Kang, Don't Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: The Merits of
Nondisclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470, 472 (1999) (arguing that informing jurors of damage
caps will unduly influence jurors and distort damage awards). There are data to support the
view that simply telling jurors of the amount at which damage verdicts are capped may serve as
a cognitive "anchor" for jury discussions of awards. See, e.g., Greene & Bornstein, supra note 4,
at 762. However, other studies have reported the more desirable effects of collaborative
instruction that fully inform the jury of statutory provisions regarding damages together with
the policy reasons for the law and the practical meaning for the jury's verdict in the case at
hand. See id. at 755-56; Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury
to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 513
(1992).
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be other ways in which jurors' legitimate interests arise in certain
proposals for tort reform, but the two identified here appear paramount.
These criteria can serve as twin bases for assessing and ranking
the potential that many tort reform proposals hold for jurors in tort
cases. In the appendix to this Essay, the author rates each proposal,
using a scale of 0 to 6, in terms of their salience for jurors. A zero
suggests "No Salience For Jurors," a 3 or 4 "Potential Salience," and
6 "High and Immediate Salience." ' 7
Juror's "stakes" in sixty tort reforms are ranked by the author.
Using the calculus developed in this Essay, only three are thought to
have "High and Immediate Salience" for jurors. One is selfexplanatory: "Improve training and education of trial judges in
matters of jury comprehension and science and law topics." One
would think that trial lawyers could benefit from the same regimen,
but no such mention was found. The other two would add empirical
data to evidence already heard on questions of central importance in
tort law and of demonstrated difficulty for jurors: the standard of
care in medical malpractice litigation and determinations of damages
for pain and suffering. The latter are discussed at greater length
below.
IV. Two EXAMPLES OF REFORM PROPOSALS OF "HIGH SALIENCE"
FOR JURORS

A.

Objective Proofof the Standardof Care in Medical Malpractice
Litigation

Widespread criticism has been leveled at the usual way of proving up a party's version of the standard of care in medical malpractice
cases, that is, through opinion testimony by carefully preselected and
highly paid medical experts. Most surveyed judges8 and many stu-

7. See infra app.

8. See SHIRLEY A. DOBBIN & SOPHIA I. GATOWSKI, A JUDGE'S DESKBOOK ON THE
BASIC PHILOSOPHIES AND METHODS OF SCIENCE 15 (State Justice Institute ed. 1999)
(providing a national survey of 400 state trial court judges who indicated that their most serious
problems with expert testimony were (1) extensive disagreement, (2) abandonment of
objectivity, and (3) excessive cost); MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS 5 (2000) (surveying federal trial

judges who reported that their the most frequent problems with party experts as (1) lack of
objectivity, (2) excessive expense, and (3) opinions "of questionable validity or reliability").
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dents of the litigation process9 decry the lack of objectivity of partyretained experts, their low rate of accuracy, their high cost, their
frequent lack of firsthand knowledge about the phenomena at issue,
and their faulty memories. Moreover, conflicting expert testimony
too often leaves lay juries with the difficult task of deciding which
expert to believe and how much weight to give their opinions. The
problems posed by partisan experts are not unique to medical malpractice litigation; according to evidence experts, they have plagued
modern litigation for decades.10
Three modest, but effective, proposed reforms would supplement opinion testimony about the standard of care with empirical
data that describes actual physician performance in like situations.
The principal proposal is to use data from medical databases, where
such data have been collected, to report on the nature and range of
physician or nurse conduct in similar cases.' Proponents of this form
of empirical evidence argue that "the verified and reverifiable collective experience of dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of cases cared
for by comparably expert physicians.. ." would provide a necessary
buffer for jurors from the "inevitably flawed, inaccessible, anecdotal
12
recollection of a single [party-retained] expert.'
Advocates of another approach acknowledge that use of medical
databases is preferable where the data already exist, but propose the
use of surveys of similarly qualified and situated physicians concerning their approaches to care and their opinions of their peers' practices in treating like conditions where information collected in
databases is inadequate. They claim that survey results will "provide
a measure of objectivity and validity to the assessment of the appropriate standard of care in a malpractice case,.., assist juries in

9. See generally Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice
Standard of Care: Bridging Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
821 (2002); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Empirical Evidence and Malpractice Litigation, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 757 (2002).

10. See, e.g., Morgan, supranote 1, at 733.
11. William Meadow, Operationalizingthe Standardof Medical Care: Uses and Limitations
of Epidemiology to Guide Expert Testimony in Medical Negligence Allegations, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 675 (2002). Such databases currently exist and are available to be mined for
these purposes. Moreover, the databases continue to grow rapidly and they are becoming
"smarter." See Mark A. Hall et al., Measuring Medical PracticePatterns: Sources of Evidence
from Health Services Research, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 779 (2002); William M. Johnston, As
Medical DatabasesGrow, They Are Becoming Smarter, ANAESTHESIA NEWS, June 2001, at 5.
12. Meadow, supranote 11, at 677.
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choosing between the conflicting testimony of expert witnesses,"13 and
will supply "an additional and persuasive basis for [an] expert's
testimony .... ,,14

The third approach to supplementing the more subjective and
sometimes misleading opinion testimony by party experts is the use of
clinical practice guidelines ("CPGs"). 15 Clinical practice guidelines

are "systematically developed statements ... about appropriate
health care for specific clinical circumstances. ' ' 16 Initially hailed as an
improvement on traditional expert testimony concerning the standard
of care, CPGs appear to have fallen from favor because of their

inherent vagueness, their relatively low visibility among many practitioners and because they are more aspirational in nature than purely
descriptive of actual practice." Whatever the future of CPGs in court,
the rationales of the appellate decisions upholding their admission in
evidence, on the theory that they constitute evidence of customary

medical practice (or of the aspirational standard), appear to point the

18
way for the admission of the other two forms of data.

B.

Use PriorAwards in Like Cases To Better Inform Jury Discretion
in Determining Damagesfor Pain and Suffering

When jurors are asked to return damage awards for pain and suffering, or for loss of life, as they are in most tort cases, they have
practically no guidance in determining the amount to be awarded.
13. Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those
Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 753 (2002).
14. Id.
15. See STEPHEN J. SCHANZ, DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING CLINICAL PRACTICE
GUIDELINES: LEGAL ASPECTS 48 (1999); Angela Campbell & Kathleen Cranley Glass, The
Legal Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies, Codes, and Guidelines in Medical Practice and
Research, 46 MCGILL L.J. 473 (2001).
16. Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical PracticeGuidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation,149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 647 (2001).
17. Cramm, supra note 13; Mello, supra note 9, at 845-47.
18. See, e.g., Wareing v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Washington v.
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d. 177 (D.C. 1990); Thomas v. United States, 530 A.2d. 217 (D.C.
1987); Darling v. Charleston Comm. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (111. 1965); Frakes v.
Cardiology Consultants, No. 01-A-01-9702-CV-00069, 1997 WL 536949, (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
29, 1997); see generally SCHANZ, supra note 15; Campbell & Glass, supra note 15. Assuming a
proper foundation regarding soundness of methodology and similarity of subjects, statistical
studies and survey results also are admissible in evidence to assist in proving the standard of
care, at least to the extent allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 703. See Shari Seidman
Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 229, 233-35 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2000); David H. Kaye & David A.
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
83, 86 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2000).
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With only the vaguest of legal instructions 9 and the suggestions and

arguments of counsel20 to guide them, jurors are regularly required to
agree on an amount of money that will "fully and fairly compensate
plaintiff."
From time to time during the past several years, both as part of
more comprehensive "tort reform" packages and as stand-alone

proposals to improve jury decision making, social scientists and legal
scholars have suggested ways to guide and assist jurors in determining
general damages. Chief among the ideas are proposals that jurors be
informed by counsel or the court of reported empirical data describ-

ing the range of damages awarded in the recent past by other juries in
21
similar cases.
Jurors themselves have expressed the need for better guidance in

deciding damage awards. Researchers have heard "strongly worded
complaints about the ambiguity involved in their assigned task" and
about their mistaken beliefs that they would receive more help from
22
the court and the parties.

C.

EmpiricalSources of ProofMay Enhance Jury Decision Making

Using information from medical databases and results of physician surveys to help establish the standard of medical care is func-

tionally similar to providing jurors with "schedules" of past damage
awards in similar cases. 23 First, both forms of evidence are empirical
in nature-as they derive from databases of stored real-world outcomes. Both reform proposals involve evidence that is external to the
case at hand, less subject to party and witness control. Also, they
19. Greene & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 745-47; Vidmar, supra note 4, at 885; see generally
Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases:
Problems and Possibilities,6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712 (2000).
20. In some states, counsel are prohibited from even suggesting a specific damage award to
the jury. L. S. Groff, Annotation, Propriety and PrejudicialEffect of Reference by Plaintiffs
Counsel, in Jury Trial of PersonalInjuries or Death Action, to Amount of Damages Claimed or
Expected by Client, 14 A.L.R. 3d 541, § 4 (1967).
21. See generally James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools
for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991); Shari Seidman
Diamond et al., JurorJudgments About Liability and Damages:Sources of Variability and Ways
to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1998); Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Damages:
A Commentary, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 427, 447-52 (1998).
22. See, e.g., Greene & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 743; see generally Vidmar, supra note 4.
23. At least one scholar has previously noted the parallels between efforts to educate juries
regarding damage determinations and the proposed use of accumulated empirical data in
medical malpractice litigation. See Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 325-26 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
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derive from the accumulated behaviors of other peer decision makers
in unrelated but similar situations. Next, empirical sources are more
frequently published, and therefore more open to inspection and
criticism, than the often-anecdotal observations of the expert giving a
personal opinion. Finally, statistical approaches provide a useful
objective check, or yardstick, to use in judging the more subjective
opinion evidence introduced by the parties.2 4 Giving jurors a yardstick to use in assessing general damages is a technique that has also
been described as the "kind of concrete, common-sense approach that
one would expect a jury to understand intuitively and to appreciate
easily."25
It seems self-evident, at least to this juror-centric observer, that
the proposals to objectify proof of the standard of medical care and to
better guide jury discretion by informing jurors of previous awards in
similar cases can only assist jurors in performing two of their most
26
difficult tasks. Their need for help is readily apparent.
CONCLUSION

Jurors have a stake in tort reform proposals that will enhance juror comprehension at trial and truthfully inform them about the law's
requirements and limitations where such knowledge is important to
their reaching an informed and just decision in the case. These are
additional important public policy considerations that ought to figure
into future legislative and judicial consideration of such proposals.
Jurors' needs, the public's interest in just outcomes, and the future of
the jury as an institution should be given due weight, along with the
interests of litigants, the bar, and the general public interest when
deciding whether to adopt tort reform. Two proposals-ones that
would "objectify" proof of the standard of care in malpractice litigation and provide guidance for determinations of general damagesserve as examples of reform ideas that contain the promise of more
accurate, predictable, and equitable jury verdicts.

24. Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L.
REV 1481, 1493 (1992) (characterizing of damage "scheduling"); see also SCHANZ, supra note
15, at 49 (recommending jurors' use of clinical practice guidelines to assess experts' opinions).
25. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 209 n.61 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
26. See generally B. Michael Dann, Jurors as Beneficiaries of Proposalsto Objectify Proof
of the Standardof Care in Medical Malpractice Cases, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943 (2002).
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Whether jurors will benefit from these two proposals, or from
any of the tort reforms given "high salience" for jurors in the appendix to this Essay, will depend on the politics of tort reform. At a
minimum, policymakers should add jurors to the list of "constituencies" to consider when debating the merits of any particular reform.
Jurors need all the help that tort law can provide when making the
difficult decisions we require of them.
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APPENDIX:
RATING TORT REFORM PROPOSALS' SALIENCE FOR JURORS27

0 = No Salience 6= Highest Salience
Abolish Claims or Establish Defenses
1. Abolish certain categories of torts
(e.g., third-party bad faith claims)
2. Exempt certain products or professions from liability
3. Immunize manufacturers and sellers of
inherently unsafe products
4. Statutory no-fault schemes (automobiles)
5. Eliminate seller liability where manufacturer
can be sued
6. Immunize sellers of products when unaware of defect
7. Abolish liability for unavoidably unsafe products
if adequatewarning given
8. Prohibit or limit class actions claiming alleged torts
9. Abolish joint and several liability and

substitute comparativefault scheme
10. Create statutes of repose in products and
medical malpractice cases
11. Reduce statute of limitations periods
12. Create a uniform national statute of limitations
13. Codify state-of-the-art defense for products cases
14. Establish defense in products cases for
compliance with stateand federal regulations

0
0
0
0
0
0
3-428
0
3-429

1-2 30
1-231
0
3-432

3-433

27. See supra text accompanying note 7 for an explanation of these ratings.
28. This requires that clear and comprehensible guidance be given to jurors concerning the
adequacy of warnings.
29. This requires that clear and comprehensible guidance be given to jurors on how to
allocate fault by percentage and the consequences of percentage of fault.
30. In theory, requiring claims to be brought sooner rather than later would improve the
quantity and quality of evidence heard by jurors.
31. See supra note 30.
32. This would require that clear and comprehensible guidance be given to jurors
concerning "state-of-the-art" defense.
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15. Establish defense in products cases where
government-required warning given
16. Abolish punitive damages altogether
17. Prohibit multiple punitive damage awards

for same conduct
18. Enact caps on total liability of particular industries

3-4m
0
3-435
1-236

Eliminate or Limit Role of Juries
19. Trial of all tort cases to the court without jury
20. General complexity exception (no jury in
trials of cases deemed "complex")
21. Special "blue ribbon juries" for technical cases or issues
22. All punitive damage claims tried by court without jury
23. Bifurcate trials of punitive damage claims (jury
decides whether conduct warrants imposition, judge
decides amount)

0
0
0
0

0

Preconditionsto Filing and Pleadingof Tort Claims
24. Forbid out-of-state attorneys from soliciting
local clients for tort claims
25. Prefiling screening panel for certain claims
26. Require exhaustion of alternative dispute resolution
procedures before filing formal court claim
27. Give tort defendants option to require mediation
prior to trial
28. Require that plaintiff have and file affidavit of
expert opinion regarding defect or other liability

0
137

138
139

140

33. This would require that clear and comprehensible guidance be given to jurors about
regulatory language and requirements.
34. This would require that clear and comprehensible guidance be given to jurors about
government-required warning.
35. This would require that clear and comprehensible guidance be given to jurors about
what is and what is not the "same conduct."
36. Jurors should be clearly informed of the existence, amount, and effect of a cap.
37. Theoretically, such prefiling and pretrial procedures allow parties to focus their claims
and hone the evidence.
38. See supra note 37.
39. See supra note 37.
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29. Prohibit statement in pleadings of dollar amount sought
30. Prohibit claim for punitives damages in pleadings

0
0

Regulation of Procedureand Evidence
31. Mandatory settlement conferences
32. Enact state and federal standards and definitions of
elements of product claims and various defenses
33. Allow proof of plaintiff's intoxication and
use of drugs
34. Require proof of economical and technically
safer alternative design in products cases

35. Prohibit evidence of ex post advances made in
design and manufacture
all evidence of subsequent remedial measures
Bar
36.
37. Reduce scope and amount of discovery in all tort cases
38. Greater or exclusive use of court-appointed expert
witnesses
39. Greater use of special science masters and
panels for fact finding

141

3-442

3-443
3-4"
3-445
3-446

1-247
348
3-449

40. Improve training and education of trial judges in
matters of jury comprehension on science
and law topics

41. Objectify proof of the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases

5-6

5650

40. See supra note 37.
41. See supra note 37.
42. This would require that clear and comprehensible standards and definitions be given to
jurors of the elements of a claim or a defense.
43. See supra note 42.
44. See supra note 42.
45. This proposal would deprive jurors of sometimes-relevant information that would
further inform their decision.
46. See supra note 45.
47. In principle, greater discovery avoids trial by ambush and enables parties to hone their
presentations of evidence.
48. Jury avoids a "battle of the experts," but is denied otherwise relevant and potentially
helpful opinions of privately retained experts.
49. This might keep "junk science' from the jury and allow for a more focused presentation
of complex scientific evidence.
50. See supra Part IV.A.

2003]

JURORS AND THE FUTURE OF "TORT REFORM"

42. Allow jury to hear evidence of collateral source
payments to plaintiffs
43. Provide jurors with schedule of compensatory damage
awards in simliar cases

3-451
5-652

Verdicts in Similar Cases
44. Bifurcate trials into a liability phase and a

damages phase

3-453

45. Enact more specific standards for awarding punitive
3-454

damages

46. Require showing of "actual malice" as precondition
355
to award of punitive damages
47. Exclude evidence of defendant's financial condition until
conduct warranting award of punitive damages
0
has been introduced
conduct
proof
on
proving
48. Elevate burden of
warranting punitive damage award to "clear and
0
convincing evidence"
Limiting Jury Discretion
49. Bifurcate liability and damage issues between
jury and judge
50. Require a unanimous jury for punitive damages
51. Allow judge to reduce damages by amounts of
collateral payments received by plaintiff
52. Require that plaintiff's future costs be made through
periodic payments

0
256

3-457

0

51. This would require that clear and comprehensible standards and definitions be given to
jurors, as well as the consequences of receiving such benefits.
52. See supra Part IV.B.
53. This could result in duplication of evidence in the second phase and deprivation of
some relevant evidence in both phases.
54. This would require that clear and comprehensible standards and definitions be given to
jurors.
55. See supra note 54.
56. This could impede the ability of a clear majority to reach a verdict.
57. The consequences of this would have to be clearly communicated to jurors.
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53. Enact caps on recovery of noneconomic damages
54. Limit punitive damage awards to a percentage
of compensatory damage awards
55. Enact caps on recovery of punitive damages
56. Limit punitives to a percentage of defendant's
net worth

3-458
3-459

3-4 60
3-461

Cost-Shifting Measures
57. Enact a "Loser Pays" rule

0

58. Eliminate or limit contingent fees

0

59. Allow juries to make defendants "whole" for

defending meritless suit

362

60. Assign part or all of punitive damage awards to state or

to public interest organization

363

58. The jurors must be informed of the existence and consequences of limits on the amount
recoverable.
59. See supra note 58.
60. See supra note 58.
61. Must provide jurors with clear and comprehensible standards and definitions of net
"net worth."
62. This would require that clear and comprehensible standards and definitions be given to
jurors.
63. This should include informing the jury of the consequences of a punitive damage
award, i.e., that the court or government will designate the "public interest" recipient.

